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DOROTHY E. ROBERTSt

Mary Mahowald's paper, Genetic Technologies and Their Impliwtions for
Women,1 insightfully considers the way genetic technologies affect vvomen
differently than men, the reasons for these differences, and whether these
differences can or should matter. By facing women's unique biology directly,
Professor Mahowald avoids the limits of a gender neutral approach that pre
tends there are no differences between men and women. Workir:,t?; towards
gender equality in the use of genetic technologies and elsewhere reqUires
attending to the biological and power differences between the sexes.
The Distinction Between Fairness and Fate

What intrigued me most about Professor Mahowald's paper is its theme of
fate and fairness.

Mahowald notes that

"[i]n very

fundamental ways,

as

Simone de Beauvoir observed decades ago, biology informs destiny for wom
en. "2 But understanding how biology becomes women's destiny and wheth�r
this result is just, depends on a distinction between fate and fairness. Accord
ing to Mahowald, certain implications of genetic technologies for women
depend entirely on biology, while others depend on socially-determined factors
as well. T hose that stem solely from biology are pretty much inevitable-they
are women's fate. However, those that stem from a combination of biology
and social causes should be subject to scrutiny to determine whether they are
r

ra1r.
.

Mahowald cites H. Tristram Englehardt's suggestion that the unequal
distribution of physical traits among individuals is due to "failures of fortune
rather than failures of fairness"3

and occurs

"naturally,

and

apparently,

inevitably."4 Although inequality that results from women's biological fate
may be un fortunate, it is not necessarily

tDorothy

unjust.

E. Roberts is a Professor of Law at Rutgers, The State University

of

New Jersey,

School of Law-Newark, S.l. Newhouse Center for Law and justice.
1.

Mary

B. Mahowald, Genetic Technologies and Their Implications for Women, 3

U Chi L Sch Roundtable 439 (1996).
2. Id at 445 (citing Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex 33 (Knopf 1953)).
3. Id at 454 (citing H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethlcs 340-41
(Oxford 1986)).
4. !d.
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Moreover, Mahowald points out that this distinction between what is
unfortunate and what is unfair, ben;veen
injustice, is not the whole story.

immutable fate and

Biology cannot be

unjust;

changeable

but society's

response to biological difference may be. lVIahowald explains several different
philosophical approaches to such "namrally occurring inequality"5 and adds

her belief that our concern for gender
seck

justice

minimize gender inequality in the

ro

requires that ·01e should at least
use

of genetic

r e c h n o l o g ie s .

gender jt.:stice is desirable," she concludes, "th�n effon:s should be made

to

"If
re

duce inequ::!lities occasioned by differences hetvveen the sexes. Where inequita
ble differences are not changeable, as in the different reproductive roles of men

and women, measures can still be introduced to reduce the gap."6
I agree with Mahowald . Even if

we

acc:pt the distinction between what is

unfortunate and what is unfair, we cs.n work to achieve gender justice. In
addition, however, I believe that the basic distinction berween fate and fairness
needs to be complicated by a recognition that the very notion of "naturally
occurring inequality" is already influenced by gender and other inequalities of
power. Race, in particular, shapes the way our society determines which in
equalities are "natural." Women's so-called biologically inevicable fate appears
more changeable on closer inspection.

As a result, it is more difficult to

separate fate from fairness than Mahowald's article suggests.
Questioning Natural Inequality

Many social values and practices are so ingrained in our culture that they
appear to be natural. For example , Englehardt distinguished between fate and
fairness by pointing to unfortunate physical traits. According to Mahowald , the
fact that "some people are more talented, more intelligent, more attractive, or
more athletically gifted than others" did not strike Englehardt as unjust
because such differences occur naturally.7 But none of these terms describes a
purely natural trait; they all incorporate a social norm of beauty, intelligence,
or talent. To say it is unfortunate that a particular woman is unattractive, for
example, leaves unchallenged the standard that deems her particular physical
traits to be undesirable in the first place. We could minimize the impact of the
inequality Englehardt observed by limiting the ways social actors like employ
ers or schools treat "naturally" unattractive people. However, we will never
really eradicate such inequalities until we question the underlying norms that
are themselves based on profound racial and gender inequality.
Thus, Pecola Breedlove, the character in Toni Morrison's The Bluest Eye
who spends her childhood praying for blue eyes,8 was not just the victim of

natural

m

isfortune. She vvas the victim of a racist standard of beauty. As a

little Black girl, she could never meet this standard even if by some miracle of

5. !d.
6. ld

at

453.

7. lei

3(

454.

8. See generally Toni Morrison, The Bluest Eye (Holt, Rinehart 1970).
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genetic technology her eyes did turn blue.9 Therefore, Engiehardt is clearly
wrong that beauty and talent are solely matters of fortune and not fairness.
Like all of us, Englehardt was so accustomed to the underlying norms used for
judging what is natural that they became transparent.
The claim that natural inequality can be demonstrated empirically does not
resolve the issue. Tests of biological difference that now seem absurd were
once accep ted by the scientific community. In 1872, for ex:;mple, one Justice

-:'[tJhc natural and proper
scientific b.r:r to JUStify upholding

of the fJnited States Suprerne Court retied
timidity and delicacy" of the female sex as

on

vvomen's exclusion from the legal profession.10
Perhaps the most influential evidence of the "natural" hierarchy of the
races was the cranial measurements collected by the Philadelphia physician, Dr.
Samuel George Morton.11 Morton attempted to calculate the cranial capacities
of five major races (Caucasian, Mongoloid, Malay, American Indian, and
Ethiopian) by measuring over eight hundred skulls from throughout the world.
In Crania Americana, published in 1839, Morton reported that the Caucasian
skull measured the largest; American Indians were much smaller; and Negroes
measured at the

bottom.12 Assuming that skull size reflected intelligence,

Morton's data purported to substantiate the intellectual inferiority of Blacks.13

Nature and Genetics
This confusion between what is natural and what is social is particularly
rampant in matters involving genetics. The desire to have genetically-related
children, for example, is commonly attributed to nature. In his recent book,
Children of Choice, John Robertson asserts, "at the most basic level transmis
sion of one's genes through reproduction is an animal or species urge closely
linked to the sex drive." 14 Robertson posits the frustration of "their normal
species

urge

to

procreate"15

as

the

motivation

for

couples'

use

of

reproduction-assisting technologies and he praises these technologies for freeing
us from the "luck of the natural lottery."16 His words are reminiscent of the
opening paragraph of a popular guide to infertility treatment which declared:

9. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan L
Rev 581, 597 (1990).
10. Bradwell v Illinois, 83 US 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley concurring) (emphasis added).
11. See S.G. Morton, Crania Americana (Pennington 1839). See also Stephen Jay
Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (Norton 1981 ).
12. IV!orron, Crania Americana at 147-51 (cited in note 11).
13. Stephen Jay Gould has demonstrated that Morton's conclusions suffered from
numerous methodological errors and miscalculations, as well as its erroneous premise
linking skull size to intellectual ability. Gould, Mismeasure of 1Vfan at 54-69 (cited in note
11)

0

14. john

Robertson,

Children

Technologies 24 (Princeton 1994).

15. Id at 98.
16. ld ar 3.

of Choice:

Freedom

and

The

New

Reproductive
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"Call it a cosmic sp a r k or spiritual fulfillment, biological need or human
destiny-the desire for a family rises unbidden from our genetic souls." 17
Yet, the desire to have genetically-related children is at least influenced, if
not created, by our culture. Our p r e o c cup a t ion with defining people according
to their genetic background, which tends to reinforce existing social hierarchies
and create new ones, may reflect the social dominance of patriarchy. As a
result,

a

numbe�· of feminists have advocated :1bandoning the genetic model of
j

.
J 1ts " preoccupation
.
. h m2. 1 e seeu,
parenthoor,
wtc.,

"18

.

and the

rna

i[
le stan d·point
.
.

reflects. Instead, feminists advocate a feminist st::�ndpoint that is nor based on
notions of superiority and dominance. For example, Mahowald quotes Sara
Ruddick's advocacy of '"an engaged vision of the world opposed and superior
ro dominant ways of thinking."'19 Others denne the feminist standpoint as
one that is anti-hierarchical.20 Overall, feminists resist the trend in science ,
law, and popular culture toward "genetic essentialism,"21 "geneticization,"22
or "geneticism."23 They question the view that "personal traits are predictable
and permanent, determined at conception, 'hardwired' into the human constitu
tion."24
The way Americans think about genetics was also shaped by the idea of
racial purity that was supported by law, violence, and social convention for
over three centuries.ZS The fact that race is inherited influences the meaning
of the genetic tie in American culture.26 For example, the institution of slav
ery made the genetic tie to a slave mother critical to determining a child's
social

status,

yet

legally

insignificant

to

the

relationship

between

male

slaveowners and their mulatto children.27 Today we generally assume that the

17. See Sarah Franklin, Deconstructing "Desperateness": The Social Construction of
Infertility in Popular Representations of New Reproductive Technologies, in Maureen
McNeil, Ian Varcoe, and Steven Yearley, eds, The New Reproductive Technologies 200,

207 (St. Martin's 1990).
18. Joan C. Callahan, ed, Reproduction, Ethics, and the Law: Feminist Perspectives 11
(Indiana 1995). See also, for example, Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood:
Ideology and Technology in Patriarchal Society 29-35 (Norton 1989).

19. Mahowald, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable ar 461 (cited in note 1) (quoting Sara
Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace 129 (Beacon 1989)).

20. See, for example, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4
UCLA Women's L J 59, SO (1993).

21. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Dorothy Nelkin, The jurisprudence of Genetics, 45
Vand L Rev 313, 320-21 (1992).

22. Abby Lippman, Prenata l Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and

Inequities, 17 Am J L & Med 15, 19 (1990).
23. See generally Susan M. Wolf, Beyond "Genetic Discrimination": Toward the

Reinforcing

Broader Harm of Geneticism, 23 J Law Med & Ethics 345 (1995).

24. Dreyfuss and Nelkin, 45 Yand L Rev at 320-21 (cited in note 21).
25. See A. Leon Higginbotham, ] r., and Barbara K. Kopyroff, Racial Purity and Inter·
o/ Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 Georgetown L J 1967,

racial Sex in the Law

1967-69 (1989).
26. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U Chi L Rev 209 (1995).
27. Id

at

225-28.
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genetic tie creates an enduring bond between parents and their children.
However, the law sometimes disregards this genetic bond2s and is especially
likely to do so if the bond is between poor Black mothers and their chil

dren.29
Although ge netic technology deals with bi o logical facts, genetic technolo
gies that purport to rely solely on biologically-based factors to determine their
use also rely on sociaily-dccun:ined factors. For example, we must question

whether it is

s

natural a:r.d i;-;cvitabk product of biological fact th;:H "women

:ather than men undergo p,-!.:nd��d gem:tic

tesrs

and interventions undertaken in

response to such tests, wherher these be pregnancy terminations or fetal thera
pies."30 Cerrainly it is biolog1caliy determined that only women can become
pregnant and gestate a fetu:;, b12t men are equally able to undergo testing for
genetic anomalies. It is also not natural that courts, in some cases, invade
women's autonomy by requiring them to undergo medical interventions for the
sake of the fetus. According to many feminists, these forced treatment deci
sions equate women with inert vessels or fetal containers, disregard their own
reproductive decisions, and value them solely for their capacity to nurture a
fetus.31

Moreover,

these

decisions

are

disproportionately

imposed

against

women of color, reflecting the extra disregard for minorities' reproductive deci
sions.32 Although some people find it natural that women should undergo
these interventions, even against their will, because it is natural that they
become pregnant, we do not require fathers to donate bone marrow for the
sake of their children just because they are naturally fathers.33 In fact, the
reason courts are more likely to impose requirements on pregnant women has
to do with the social role of women, not biology.
Another example of social norms masquerading as biological fact can be
seen by examining couples' reasons for using in vitro fertilization ("IVF"). IVF
offers couples who are naturally infertile a way to have a genetically-related
child. Yet at least half of women who undergo IVF are themselves fertile and
could conceive a child

using artificial insemination. These women usually

endure the greater risks and expense of IVF simply to enable their infertile
husbands to have a genetic inheritance.34

28. Id at 252-64. The law often disregards the genetic tie between parents and children
tn cases involving so-called surrogate mothers, sperm donors, and unwed fathers.
29. Id at 2.67-69.
m note 1).
Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's
Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 Harv Women's L J 9, 57-58 (1987).
32. See generaily Lisa C. Ikernoro, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in
the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 Tenn L Rev 487 (1992); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv L Rev 1419 (1991).
33. See Robertson, Children o/ Chozce at 193 (cited in note 14).
34. See Judith Lorber, Choice, Gift, or Patriarchal Bargain? Women's Consent to In
Vitro Fertilization in Male [n(ertil;ty, in He!en Bequaert Holmes and Laura M. Purdy, eds,
Feminist Perspectives in kledical Ethics 169, 171 (Indiana 1992).

30. Mahowald, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 442 (cited
31. See, for example, Janet Gallagher,
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Roundtable
Nature as an Excuse for Social Inequality
Categorizing inequality as "natural" is

a

powerful tool of oppression.

Perpetrators of the most horrible inhumanity have enlisted supposed biological
facts as the supreme justification for their domination. Calling the fate of
subordinated groups a natural misfortune assuages the guilt of those in power
who thereby assume no responsibility for soci�1!

during the Progressive Era utilized this method

to

nality as inherited traits in order to reinforce an.J

inequality. Eugenic theory
explain poverty and crimi

justify the

prevailing social

order.35 Despite the biological "facts" advanced to support the government's
eugenic program, it actually punished those who deviated from social norms.
Officials claimed that Carrie Buck, the plaintiff in

B!tck

Bell/"

v

for example,

was sterilized due to an alleged mental disability. Historical research reveals,
however, that she was sterilized because she \Vas poor and had been pregnant
out of wedlock.37 Eugenicists pretended that the condition of the oppressed
stemmed from their own incurable, inherited deficiencies rather than political,
economic, or social realities. As Donald MacKenzie put it, eugenic theory was
"a way of reading the structure of the social classes onto nature. "33
In the recent best-seller, The Bell Curve/9 Richard Herrnstein and Charles
Murray, like the early eugenicists, attempt to provide a biological explanation
for America's class structure. They claim that intelligence levels differ among
ethnic groups because of biological fate and that this lower group intelligence
accounts for social problems, such as poverty, unemployment, and welfare de
pendency. In other words, they argue that America's social inequality results
from the biological misfortune of the oppressed and not our failure to support
egalitarian social programs.
Conclusion
There are undeniable biological differences between women and men and
these differences may in fact be inevitable. Similariy, the color of one's skin is
a function of one's genetics. However, "differences" between the sexes and the
races, in many cases, matter solely because they hdve been "transformed into
social and economic deprivation. 'H0 Therefore,

people interested in social

justice should always test claims of biological difference to see whether or not

35. See Dorothy E. Roberts,

Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 Tubne

L Rev 1945,

1963-64 ( 1993).
36. 274 us 200 (1927).

37. See generally Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 93 Natural Hist 14 (July
1984).
33. Donald A. MacKenzie, Statistics in Britain,
Scientific Knowledge 18 (Edinburgh 1981).

1865-1930: The

Social Construction of

39. See generally Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles l'vlurray, The Bell Curve: Intelli

gence and Class Structure in America (Free Press 1994 ).
40. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence o( 1:erninist Jurisprudence:
1 373, 1396 (1986).

An Essay, 95 Yale L J
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they actually cloak a social norm that has become transparent because of
socially imposed gender and racial inequalities.

